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Glen 0. Robinson • • 
The flowering of the "information age" has been attended by 
flourishing speculation and commentary about the significance 
and implications of the new electronic-information media which 
form the heart of this new age. 
The new age promises much, or so we are told by those who 
dabble in the arcana of electronic science. One author of several 
popular books on information technology offers the following 
vision: 
Imagine a city ten or twenty years in the future, with parks and flowers and 
lakes, where the air is crystal clear and most cars are kept in large parking lots on 
the outskirts. The high-rise buildings are not too close, so they all have good 
views, and everyone living in the city can walk through the gardens or rain-free 
pedestrian malls to shops, restaurants, or pubs. The city has cabling under the 
streets and new forms of radio that provide all manner of communication facili-
ties. The television sets, which can pick up many more channels than today's 
television, can also be used in conjunction with small keyboards to provide a 
multitude of communication services. The more affiuent citizens have 7-foot tele-
vision screens, or even larger. 
There is less need for physical travel than in an earlier era. Banking can be 
done from home, and so can as much shopping as is desired. There is good deliv-
ery service. Working at home is encouraged and is made easy for some by the 
videophones that transmit pictures and documents as well as speech. Meetings 
and symposia can be held with the participants in distant locations. 
Some homes have machines that receive transmitted documents. With these 
machines one can obtain business paperwork, news items selected to match one's 
interests, financial or stock market reports, mail, bank statements, airline sched-
ules, and so on. Many of these items, however, are best viewed on the home 
screens rather than in printed form. 
There is almost no street robbery, because most persons carry little cash. 
Restaurants and stores all accept bank cards, which are read by machines and can 
be used only by their owners. When these cards are used to make payments, 
funds may be automatically transferred between the requisite bank accounts by 
telecommunications. Citizens can wear radio devices for automatically calling 
• Late Professor of Political Science, M.l.T. 
•• John C. Stennis Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I wish to thank Ron 
Cass for invaluable discussions about the first amendment generally, as well as particular 
comments on this essay-though I think he will want to disown responsibility for at least 
some of the views herein. 
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police or ambulances if they wish. Homes have burglar and fire alarms connected 
to the police and fire stations. 
Industry is to a major extent run by machines. Automated production lines 
and industrial robots carry out much of the physical work, and data processing 
systems carry out much of the administrative work. . . . 
Above all there is superlative education. History can be learned with pro-
grams as gripping and informative as Alistair Cooke's America. University 
courses modeled on England's Open University use television and remote com-
puters; degrees can be obtained via television. Computer-assisted instruction, 
which was usually crude and unappealing in its early days, has now become 
highly effective. I 
Not everyone sees the new age in such a bright light. There is 
a "dark side" to the force, as we have been reminded more or less 
continuously for nearly thirty-five years since Orwell's grim depic-
tion in 1984 of the manipulation of information to enslave society. 
Ithiel de Sola Pool's Technologies of Freedom could not fairly 
be placed at either end of the spectrum of speculation. He does 
not hype the wonders of the new age. His description of the uses 
of new electronic technologies is restrained and matter of fact. 
Nor does he indulge in quite the apocalyptic scenarios of 1984. 
However, Pool is concerned mostly with the negative conse-
quences of the new technologies and presents the negative side in 
decidedly melodramatic terms. 
Despite the title of the book, which suggests that the new in-
formation technologies will yield new freedoms, Pool fears they 
may instead be a kind of Trojan horse introducing government 
controls that erode old freedoms. The warning is sounded at the 
beginning under the ominous caption, "A Shadow Darkens": 
Civil liberty functions in a changing technological context. For five hundred 
years a struggle was fought, and in a few countries won, for the right of people to 
speak and print freely, unlicensed, uncensored, and uncontrolled. But new tech-
nologies of electronic communication may now relegate old and freed media such 
as pamphlets, platforms, and periodicals to a comer of the public forum. Elec-
tronic modes of communication that enjoy lesser rights are moving to center 
stage. The new communication technologies have not inherited all the legal im-
munities that were won for the old. When wires, radio waves, satellites, and com-
puters became major vehicles of discourse, regulation seemed to be a technical 
necessity. And so, as speech increasingly flows over those electronic media, the 
five-century growth of an unabridged right of citizens to speak without controls 
may be endangered. 
Alarm over this trend is common, though understanding of it is rare2 
Near the close of the book Pool reassures us that "[c]alamity is not 
l. J. MARTIN, THE WIRED SOCIETY 8-9 (1978). Notwithstanding this rather fanciful 
description, Martin's book is a useful description of current technologies. 
2. I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM l (1983). 
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foreordained."J With a bit more vigilance we can rescue our 
traditional freedoms from the grasp of government controls; then 
(and only then) will the new technologies realize their potential as 
"technologies of freedom." 
Pool is scarcely the first scholar to perceive the existence of 
different first amendment traditions for electronic and print me-
dia, nor the first to perceive that the expanding role of electronic 
media, and consequent displacement of print, might cause a gen-
eral corrosion of those robust first amendment values associated 
with the print media.4 Pool himself relies less on prior scholarship 
than on reporters, on William Paley (chairman of CBS), Senator 
Bob Packwood, and an unidentified gaggle of "civil libertarians 
and free marketers."5 Since only Paley and Packwood are identi-
fied, the strength of support for Pool's concern is difficult to evalu-
ate. However, Pool's attempt to convey the impression of a 
widespread public concern ("alarm . . . is common") is quite mis-
leading. Pool is not alone in his concern, but I see no evidence of 
widespread "alarm" among the citizenry in general or constitution 
watchers in particular. 
Nevertheless, Pool is entitled to have his case judged by the 
strength of his argument, not the number of his allies, so let us 
turn directly to that argument. 
I 
It would be easier to evaluate Pool's argument if he had more 
sharply separated his description of trends in electronic media 
from his evaluation of their legal implications. Nevertheless his 
description of the media and their histories contains useful infor-
mation and some interesting insights. Pool's discussion of tech-
nology and its contemporary and future uses is not original, nor is 
his account of the social-legal history of the media and their insti-
tutional environment.6 However, his generalization of evolution-
3. /d. at 189. 
4. On different regulatory treatment of the media, see Schmidt, Pluralistic Program· 
ming and Regulation of Mass Communications Media in COMMUNICATIONS FOR To-
MORROW: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980s 191 (G. Robinson ed. 1978). On the 
possible corrosion of free speech values as a consequence of electronic displacement of 
print, see Owen, The Role of Print in the Electronic Society, in id at 229, 242. 
5. I. PooL, supra note 2, at 1-3. Ironically, Pool cites Senator Packwood's proposed 
constitutional amendment, intended to eliminate "discrimination" among communications 
media. as evidence of the common "alarm." Packwood dropped the idea when it failed to 
generate any enthusiasm even from the media it was intended to benefit. See BROADCAST-
ING, Apr. 18, 1983, at 39-40. 
6. With respect to communications technology and attendant social issues in gen-
eral, see, e.g., W. DIZARD, THE COMING INFORMATION AGE: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS TECH-
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ary trends in different media is a valuable addition to the 
literature. 
A major theme in the evolution of modern media is the con-
vergence of once-separate modes of communication. Pool's expla-
nation is central to his concern over the fate of constitutional 
protection for the new media: 
A process called the "convergence of modes'' is blurring the lines between 
media, even between point-to-point communications, such as the post. telephone. 
and telegraph, and mass communications, such as the press, radio, and television. 
A single physical means-be it wires, cables or airwaves-may carry services that 
in the past were provided in separate ways. Conversely, a service that was pro-
vided in the past by any one medium-be it broadcasting, the press, or teleph-
ony---<an now be provided in several different physical ways. 
Technology-driven convergence of modes is reinforced by the economic pro-
cess of cross-ownership. The growth of conglomerates which participate in many 
businesses at once means that newspapers, magazine publishers. and book pub-
lishers increasingly own or are owned by companies that also operate in other 
fields. Both convergence and cross-ownership blur the boundaries which once 
existed between companies publishing in the print domain that is protected by the 
First Amendment and companies involved in businesses that are regulated by 
government. Today. the same company may find itself operating in both fields. 
The dikes that in the past held government back from exerting control on the 
print media are thus broken down7 
Pool's description of technological and economic trends is largely 
unexceptional. One might quibble with his use of the term "con-
vergence" to describe both technological merger of media func-
tions and common ownership of distinctive media, since the latter 
does not necessarily imply any integration of technological or 
managerial functions.s Common ownership of distinctive media 
should not raise the same kind of concerns as functional integra-
tion. After all, we have had common ownership of newspapers 
NOLOGY, EcONOMICS, & POLITICS (1982). On the social-legal environment of the 
electronic mass media, a good general historical summary of principal events (with empha-
sis on broadcasting) can be found inS. HEAD & C. STERLING. BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 
(4th ed. 1982). Individual histories of particular issues (e.g .. allocations. program regula-
tion. licensing) appear in countless books. monographs. and articles. See. e.g .. the bibliog-
raphy in E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE PoLITICS OF BROADCAST 
REGULATION 286-98 (3d ed. 1982). On telecommunications. see. e.g .. G. BROCK. THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (1981). 
7. I. PooL. supra note 2. at 23-24. 
8. When the FCC investigated common ownership of broadcast stations and news-
papers in the same community. the evidence suggested that the broadcast stations and 
newspapers were operated separately with virtually no integration of operations except 
possibly at the highest executive levels. Of course. the FCC rules presuppose some interre-
lated decision making; that was a necessary condition of its concern about restriction of 
viewpoint diversity. See Multiple Ownership of Standard. FM and TV Broadcast Stations, 
50 F.C.C. 2d 1046 ( 1975). ajf'd sub nom. FCC v. National Citizens Comm'n for Broadcast-
ing. 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
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and broadcast stations for fifty years or more, with no apparent 
encroachment of broadcast regulation into the newspaper sector. 
But let me pass over that point for the moment and address the 
central concern of convergence-the danger of "regulatory creep" 
into the sanctum sanctorum of the first amendment. 
Pool's analysis of how media convergence is conducive to 
regulatory creep is not very precisely delineated. I take the sense 
of it to be that regulation is a kind of disease which is transmitted 
by contact or close association. If unfettered media become too 
closely associated with regulated media, they will come to be iden-
tified with the latter and treated accordingly. Although "conta-
gion" is, I think, a fair metaphor for what Pool suggests, it is 
perhaps analytically more useful to say that confusion in media 
functions produces a risk of confusion in legal models. 
However described, Pool's fear of regulatory encroachment is 
not without substance. Convergence of technologies and/or serv-
ices does indeed create the potential for confusion of different le-
gal models. A now-classic example is the integration of computers 
and communications facilities, which brings together the products 
of an unregulated market (the computer) and a regulated market 
(the communications facility). Which legal model governs the in-
tegrated product? Should the FCC regulate IBM "computer" ter-
minals with communications capabilities or deregulate AT&T 
"telephone" terminals with data processing capabilities?9 This co-
nundrum has now been judicially resolved in favor of the latter 
option by the 1982 AT&T Consent Decree, but the great concern 
once generated by this problem lends some credibility to Pool's 
thesis. A somewhat similar problem now confronts local regula-
tors. They must decide whether cable systems should be subject to 
public utility regulation of data transmission and other "tele-
phone-like" services or whether they should continue to be treated 
as merely conduits for radio and television signals ("broadcast-
like").JO This problem has not yet been resolved, though indica-
tions are that Congress will intervene to insist on the laissez-faire 
9. The issue is nicely illustrated by IBM v. FCC, 570 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1978), involv-
ing the lawfulness of an AT&T "smart" communications terminal, Dataspeed 40/4. In 
that case, the FCC decided that the device was a regulatable communications terminal 
rather than a general purpose computer, but it was forced to concede the line of distinction 
was a fine one and would inevitably disappear. Subsequently the FCC resolved this prob-
lem by deciding to regulate all customer premises requirements, however styled. Second 
Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384 ( 1980); on reconsideration, 84 F.C.C. 2d 50 (1980)? on 
further reconsideration. 88 F.C.C. 2d 512 (1981), ajf'd sub nom. Computer and Commumca-
tions Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. C1r. 1982). 
10. See TELEPHONE BYPASS NEWS, May 1983, at 15-19. 
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option as part of a more general deregulation of cable. Neither 
example presents a significant first amendment problem. 
While both of these examples involve a recurrent problem in 
the choice of legal models to govern technologically changing ac-
tivities, a more serious potential for model confusion might ap-
pear to arise from the threatened takeover of traditional print 
information services by electronic media. The emergence of com-
puterized, on-demand access to electronic data bases ("electronic 
publishing") illustrates the threat to the print media (particularly 
newspapers), which many observers (Pool among them) foresee in 
the not distant future. II Whether electronic publishing is a threat 
to the survival of print traditions is not, however, a question of 
media convergence or of confusion of legal models.12 Except in a 
somewhat Pickwickean sense there is no real "convergence" in the 
substitution of electronics for print. The proper concern is not 
confusion of legal models arising from a melding of media func-
tions, so much as the disappearance of print and with it the print 
"culture." The problem, if there is one, is not model "conver-
gence" or "confusion," but simply competition. 
And this is an old problem. Competition between print and 
electronic media is not some new outgrowth of "electronic pub-
lishing," broadband transmission systems (such as cable, satellite 
broadcasting), and other such marvels of the "information age." 
This "electronification" of information media (if I can call it such 
without offending devotees of the Q.E.D.) has been a reality since 
the maturation of radio and television. The more recent growth in 
computerization and related technology has enhanced the role of 
II. The basic model for what Pool (at 193) calls "on-demand publishing" (the more 
common argot is "electronic publishing") is videotex, a service still in its experimental 
stage in the United States though more fully developed in Great Britain. Videotex involves 
coordinate use of regular telephone or two-way cable services and the television receiver-
though eventually it is possible that specialized terminals will be developed for this service. 
Videotex is to be distinguished from more limited teletext services that involve piggyback-
ing information services onto television signals by use of the vertical scanning interval. 
12. I would set to one side the "economic convergence" implied by the cross-owner-
ship of electronic and print media. Pool is generally critical of some regulations that have 
restricted cross-ownerships involving electronic media. While some of the regulations 
"seem sensible" others seem "absurdly wrong-headed." I. PooL, supra note 2, at 53. Since 
he does not tell us which is which, I cannot tell whether I agree or not as a matter of policy. 
However, as a matter of constitutional law, I have a very basic disagreement with his pro-
nouncement that: "useful or not, these requirements [restricting cross-ownership of elec-
tronic media] ... would be totally unconstitutional as applied to print. Yet over the 
electronic media, government has exercised its authority in ponderous detail." Jd Pool 
offers no authority to support this remarkable statement, and I can think of none. The 
Supreme Court's decisions involving application of antitrust laws to newspapers indicate 
that Pool's dogmatic assertion is just wrong. See, e.g., Citizen Publish. Co. v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I (1945). 
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the electronic media and will no doubt increase its dominance in 
the future. Whether it will so far displace the print media as to 
alter our perceptions of media and their social role is not so clear. 
Plainly enough the print media have survived several decades of 
electronic growth. In defiance of some forecasts of decline, the 
print media appear to be remarkably healthy. The growth of elec-
tronic media appears even to have helped some print media, as 
when books become best sellers after being dramatized on televi-
sion. Indeed, almost all information about the electronic media, 
from how-to books and periodicals on home computers to social 
critiques of the information age (such as Pool's book), appears in 
print. 
Moreover, whatever impact electronification may have had 
on print media, it has not yet visibly affected first amendment atti-
tudes toward the traditional media. As Pool describes events, sig-
nificant, if still incomplete, media convergence and electronic 
dominance have already appeared. Yet no "pollution" of first 
amendment values has been seen. Indeed, the Court's use of dif-
ferent rules for print and electronic media is widely noted and is 
criticized by Pool himself. Finessing for the moment the question 
whether such disparate treatment can be justified, it does evince 
the staying power of the libertarian tradition which Pool perceives 
to be so vulnerable. 
If we scan more generally the jurisprudence of the first 
amendment in the past quarter century (a period in which the 
electronic media reached maturity), we see that the libertarian tra-
dition, far from being weakened by the regulatory culture of the 
electronic age, has become stronger. Consider, for example, the 
expanded scope of protection for media comment on public affairs 
since New York Times v. Sullivan .13 Notwithstanding recurrent 
complaints about the Court's refusal to go further, the scope of 
this protection has unarguably expanded since the pre-electronic 
age. Other examples come readily to mind: press access to court 
proceedings has expanded even in the face of concern about tele-
vised coverage; protection for reportage of sensitive information 
has not suffered from the regulatory ethic associated with 
television.I 4 
This expansion in constitutional protection for the print me-
dia at the very time when our constitutional sensibilities were sup-
posedly being dulled by electronic-age values would seem to be a 
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
14. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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severe embarrassment to Pool's basic premise. However, Pool 
takes the "long view" of things. He envisions a time when elec-
tronics is so dominant that nothing is left on which to hang tradi-
tional constitutional conceptions of the press. This vision of 
electronic hegemony requires considerable imagination since it 
does not have strong support in contemporary experience. Still, 
history has not been kind to timid imaginations. Perhaps it is time 
for bolder foresight and prediction, to prepare us for the world 
when it catches up to our vision--or at least to Pool's vision. 
II 
We have yet to consider the underlying foundations of Pool's 
concerns. His apprehension about the future of the first amend-
ment is based, first, on a perception that the first amendment treat-
ment of print differs from that of the electronic media, and, 
second, on a normative judgment that the treatment of print pro-
vides the appropriate constitutional model for both. 
The book's legal analysis is not one of its strengths. The 
treatment of traditional first amendment jurisprudence is not only 
breathtakingly brief (about twenty pages) but also rather incoher-
ent, leaving one wondering why one particular topic or another is 
featured. Quite aside from its lack of clear purpose much of the 
discussion betrays a weak understanding of constitutional 
doctrine. 
Pool begins, for example, with a discussion of prior restraint 
doctrine, which he regards as "perhaps the most important of First 
Amendment protections ... for this bars censorship."ts Consti-
tutional lawyers undoubtedly will be surprised to see such impor-
tance accorded to prior restraint. By virtually any measure the 
prior restraint doctrine has to rank among the least important as-
pects of modem first amendment law. Though prior restraints 
continue to be singled out as warranting special judicial hostility, 
the occasions for invoking this doctrine are relatively rare. More-
over, the justification for any special treatment is highly question-
able.16 In fact modes of prior restraint sometimes may be less 
injurious to free speech interests than posterior restraints. In any 
event, prior restraint cases are hardly the centerpiece of first 
amendment law. The modem regulatory problems that concern 
Pool almost invariably fall outside the class of cases that the 
Supreme Court classifies as prior restraints. Typically the cases 
15. I. PooL, supra note 2, at 74. 
16. For incisive recent critiques see F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY 148-53 (1982); Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 ( 1983). 
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involve post-speech penalties or burdens which inhibit speech, the 
model for which is not Near v. Minnesota 11 but New York Times v. 
Sullivan .' 8 Astonishingly, Pool's only notice of the latter is a pass-
ing footnote (of no significance on this point). Yet if any single 
case is central to modern first amendment treatment of the media, 
Sullivan is that case.t9 
Following the discussion of prior restraint, other first amend-
ment concepts are recited: "clear and present danger," the balanc-
ing test, the distinction between protected and unprotected speech, 
and finally, "speech that merges into action." Pool's discussion of 
these concepts is confused. Given that his concern is to protect 
certain time-honored values of the "libertarian" tradition, one 
might have expected some evaluation of which doctrines and 
precedents are important to that libertarian objective. However, 
most of Pool's discussion is purely descriptive. The sparse com-
mentary touches on such old cliches as the debate about absolu-
tism-versus-balancing, and on more modern (but still 
overworked) questions of whether certain classes of speech lie 
outside the coverage of the first amendment and whether the press 
has special privileges. In none of these areas does Pool's surface 
scratching leave any mark. Granted, a full review of first amend-
ment jurisprudence was beyond his purpose. This is, nevertheless, 
a book about the first amendment, and one might ask for a bit 
more exploration of the issues. Even if a detailed exploration 
would be impractical, one might expect more attention to the vast 
literature on free expression. 
While Pool's discussion of constitutional doctrine seems aim-
less, his libertarian sympathies are not hard to discern. Unfortu-
nately, they are neither clearly articulated nor carefully reasoned. 
Illustrative is a passing shot at the Burger Court for being "more 
puritanical than its immediate predecessors,"2o a statement he 
supports by citations to three decisions upholding rather unusual 
regulatory controls.21 Whatever one thinks of the merits of those 
17. 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
18. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
19. See Kalven. The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the 
First Amendment", 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191. The importance of Sullivan in the first amend-
ment jurisprudence in the area of communications regulation may be seen by tracing its 
"self-censorship" concept in cases such as Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 
( 1969). Pool's emphasis on "prior restraint" in this context apparently derives from the fact 
that the regulatory controls are made in the general context of a licensing regime. How-
ever, this fact is largely irrelevant to an examination of the particular constraints imposed 
by regulation, most of which take the form of posterior burdens. The fairness doctrine, 
adjudicated in Red Lion, is a classic example. 
20. I. PooL, supra note 2, at 67. 
21. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (use of indecent language in 
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cases, to characterize them as "puritanical" suggests a rather cava-
lier indifference to the issues raised in each. Nor does it fairly 
describe the Court's obscenity decisions in this area to call them 
"puritanical," a label evoking the image of nine (or at least five) 
Comstockian curmudgeons eager to impose unwanted moral 
judgments on a hapless public. For one thing, if the Court is of 
such a disposition, it is altogether remarkable that pornography 
has flourished as could not have been imagined by those of us 
who in our salad days could not even buy a copy of such tame fare 
as Lady Chatterley's Lover .22 In any case, a scan of the Burger 
Court decisions shows no greater disposition in the direction of 
censorship than its predecessors. It was, after all, the Warren 
Court, not the Burger Court, that classified "obscenity" as unpro-
tected speech;23 the Burger Court has mainly tinkered with line-
drawing.24 
Pool's discussion of traditional law is not only cavalier in its 
examination of relevant issues and cases, it also provides no basis 
for judgment as to what must be protected against the corrosive 
influence of modern media regulation. What significance does 
Pool attach to the highly artificial distinction between prior and 
posterior restraint? What lesson do we draw from the artificial 
debate over absolutism versus balancing? Which (if any) of the 
various "traditional" obscenity criteria should we seek to preserve 
in the face of "electronification" of the media? 
III 
Pool's romanticized (not to say fanciful) image of a liberta-
rian first amendment tradition for print media contrasts sharply 
with his critical view of the interventionist tradition associated 
with electronic media-including telecommunications carriers, 
broadcast stations, and cable systems. Pool correctly perceives 
that electronic regulation has not been circumscribed by the same 
first amendment constraints applicable to print media-a fact 
which has scarcely gone unnoticed in the constitutional literature. 
afternoon radio broadcast); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning 
of adult theaters); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography). 
22. Kingsley International Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), invalidating the 
ban on the motion picture Lady Challerley's Lover, came too late for me. 
23. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
24. I am mindful that my objections to Pool's first amendment discussion might 
themselves be compared to his passing shot at the Burger Coun. There is also the risk that 
someone might misinterpret my comments as a general defense of the Burger Colin; I 
quickly disavow that purpose. The point of my critique is not to quibble with Pool's treat-
ment of this or that doctrine, but to raise questions about his judgment concerning the basic 
constitutional tenets he wishes to preserve. 
360 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:350 
The most celebrated illustration is the Supreme Court's dif-
ferent treatment of broadcast and print media in regard to man-
dated "fairness" or right-of-reply obligations, allowing such 
obligations to be imposed on broadcast stations but not on news-
papers.2s The traditional rationale has been that the number of 
broadcasters is limited by spectrum scarcity whereas no such "nat-
ural" conditions constrain print media. It is now a common 
ground of constitutional commentators that the scarcity rationale 
simply will not wash. On that point Pool has plenty of com-
pany-including me. I agree with Pool that the real spectrum 
constraint is more an artifice of regulatory policy than of physical 
limits.26 Moreover, even within the confines of that policy, the 
"natural" limits on the broadcast media are less confining than the 
economic constraints applicable to print and nonprint media 
alike. The advent of cable, which eliminates any possible spec-
trum scarcity, effectively undermines the whole edifice of such 
special treatment.27 Finally, even if spectrum scarcity did justify 
some special regulations, it is far from obvious that it justifies the 
kind of controls imposed.2s One must be particularly skeptical 
about program controls, such as the fairness doctrine, which are 
tolerated only because they are not enforced with sufficient vigor 
or rigor to cause the media serious discomfort.29 
25. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), with Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
26. Of special importance is the FCC's spectrum allocations scheme for television 
broadcasting. To promote local outlets and local service priorities, the Commission in 1952 
devised a channel assignment plan that imposed severe limits on the number of stations 
that could be accommodated. To deal with the consequences of that regulatory "scarcity" 
the commission has pursued a number of proposals, but with very limited success. For an 
extensive treatment of this problem, see Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Addi-
tional Television Networks: The Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Manage-
ment Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 875 (1981). On the scarcity rationale generally, see 
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observarions on 40 Years of Radio and Tele-
vision Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1967). 
27. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 829 (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 699 (1978). The 
Supreme Court has yet to recognize the point in the context of either broadcast or cable 
regulation. The closest it has come is a passing note in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 
U.S. 689, 709 n.I9 ( 1979), that first amendment objections to the FCC regulations requiring 
cable systems to provide access channels were "not frivolous." Because the Court invali-
dated the regulations on statutory grounds, it did not reach the constitutional issue. 
28. See Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & 
EcoN. 15, 37 (1967). As far as allocation of resources is concerned, this requires no regula-
tory scheme other than the minimal one of defining and enforcing property rights, which 
could be distributed by auction or lottery. See Robinson, The Federal Communications 
Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv., 169,240-43 (1978), and 
sources cited therein. 
29. See Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Robinson in Fairness Report Reconsid-
eration, 58 F.C.C. 2d 691, 708 (1976); see also R. CASS, REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND: 
VALUE AND DIVERSITY IN TELEVISION 50 (1981). 
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Recently, a majority of the Court has discovered another ra-
tionale for regulation, which is presumably applicable to all radio 
and television programming whatever transmission medium is 
used. In the Pacifica case the Court sustained FCC regulation of 
"indecent" programs on the ground that radio and television me-
dia are "uniquely pervasive" in society inasmuch as they intrude 
into the "privacy of the home."Jo It is yet premature to predict 
how this "pervasiveness" notion will be applied, but manifestly it 
has the potential for expansive application to electronic media 
quite independent of conditions of scarcity. 
Pacifica has had few admirers.3 1 With characteristic hyper-
bole, Pool labels it a "legal time bomb" and its rationale an "aber-
rant approach [that] could be used to justify quite radical 
censorship. "32 I do not dispute that Pacifica contains the potential 
for mischief (though not as much as Pool supposes). As an FCC 
commissioner I concurred in the FCC's decision in Pacifica, but I 
confess that my concurrence now makes me uneasy. In retrospect 
it seems to me the facts of the case did not provide the right vehi-
cle for the general principle of regulation that the FCC and the 
Court adopted.33 Indeed, it is regrettable that the issue was raised 
in the context of radio and television, for I do not think the prob-
lem of indecency or offensiveness is uniquely a problem of the 
electronic media (though I think the characteristics of every media 
are relevant variables in constitutional analysis). 
I nevertheless continue to think the general concept of "nui-
30. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Court also relied on pro-
tection of children as a rationale for regulating the time and manner of broadcasting "of-
fensive" program matter. The Court's pervasiveness rationale has been freely interpreted 
by some as an "impact" theory. See Geller & Lampert, Cable Content Regulation and the 
First Amendment, 32 CATH. L. REv. 603,615-16 (1983). I think that stretches the majority's 
opinion a bit too far. Apart from protecting children the Court showed no particular con-
cern about the influential power of broadcasting (and in the case of radio at least it would 
be hard to imagine any such power). The Court's focus is on invasion of privacy, not on 
influence. 
31. See, e.g .. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-68 (Supp. 1979); 
Schauer. Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265. 
270 (1981 ). 
32. I. PooL, supra note 2, at 134. 
33. With the luxury of hindsight, a couple of aspects of the case now make me think 
this was the wrong case for the principle involved. One is the fact that the speech in that 
case-George Carlin's monologue on "seven words you cannot say on radio" (Carlin knew 
his radio law) was probably not sufficiently "offensive" to warrant any regulation. In any 
case it is not clear that a simple time-shift in the broadcast or a warning (the two principal 
remedies endorsed by the FCC) would make much difference. Another is the whole "per-
vasiveness" rationale in both the Commission and Court opinions as applied to a radio 
broadcast which can be easily controlled or avoided. As Schauer, supra note 31, at 294. has 
observed. it was easier for the listener in Pacifica to tune out Carlin than it was for the 
viewer in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), to avert his eyes from Cohen's jacket. 
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sance" regulation, which both Court and commission adopted, is 
defensible. In this regard I am unrepentant-and plainly at odds 
with Pool to the extent he embraces traditional jurisprudence as 
applied to nonelectronic media. Under the classic Roth model of 
obscenity, the issue of constitutional protection is a categorical an-
or-nothing determination: things defined as "obscene" receive no 
protection and can be totally suppressed (they are "nonspeech"); 
things defined as "nonobscene" cannot be touched at all, except 
for "compelling" government justification. It is, I think, precisely 
this approach to the problem that has made the law of obscenity 
so unsatisfactory. Any legal rule that frames legal choice in terms 
of polar opposites with the middle ground omitted, and then 
makes that choice depend on vague and rather artificial criteria, is 
bound to induce a lot of manipulation in order to produce out-
comes closer to the midpoint where greater social consensus is 
likely to be found. This is, I think, exactly what has occurred as 
the Supreme Court has struggled to avoid the unacceptable ex-
tremes which its categorical framework invites. The result is a set 
of legal precedents that defy easy explanation in terms of that 
framework. 
Pac!fica offers a middle ground insofar as it permits some de-
gree of control over the time, place, and manner of offensive 
speech while avoiding the extreme of total tolerance or total sup-
pression. This need not be interpreted as a rule special to elec-
tronic media. Indeed, there is some precedent for such an 
approach in nonelectronic media cases.34 However, the Court has 
been unwilling to develop the precedents into a coherent princi-
ple, possibly because it has been unable to agree on what social 
values are at stake in the control of offensive speech.3s 
34. One obvious precedent, cited by the Court in Pacifica, is Young v. American Mini 
Theatres. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (approving city zoning controls on "adult" movie theatres). It 
is countered by Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating statute under which 
defendant was convicted of disturbing the peace by wearing, in a public building, jacket 
with "Fuck the Draft" written on the back), and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205 ( 1975) (invalidating ordinance which prohibited the showing of film containing nudity 
on outdoor screen, visible in public). However, neither Cohen nor Erznoznik involved 
carefully drawn time, place, and manner controls. Cohen is especially distinguishable be-
cause it involved suppression of political expression, which has always been thought to 
command the greatest protection from government interference. 
35. Though the basic problem is one of the Court's own making, I am sympathetic 
with the Court's search for a flexible doctrine. In particular I think the emphasis on "pruri-
ence" suggests a naive concern with the behavioral effects of obscenity-that it induces sex 
offenses-or a Victorian prudery about sex. Concededly, both the concern about mducmg 
sex offenses and the more general concern over public morals may underlie public, and 
judicial, antagonism. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. 
REv. 1. 3-4; Henkin, Mora/sand the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 
391 (1963). However, for me, the overriding concern with obscenity is not a matter of 
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No doubt Pool would find my suggested interpretation and 
application of Pacifica intolerable. His simpler and somewhat ro-
manticized picture of the first amendment does not tolerate much 
flexibility in regulating matters affecting speech. 
I say "matters affecting speech" because Pool is concerned 
not merely about controls that directly restrict or burden speech. 
His conception of the first amendment appears to extend to virtu-
ally any regulatory interference with a communications medium, 
including not only "the press," but also purely transmission con-
duits such as the telephone. This undiscriminating approach to 
first amendment application is unsound. Even if one accepts this 
expansive concept of first amendment coverage, the degree of con-
stitutional protection cannot be the same throughout the range of 
its possible application. 
One must distinguish regulations aimed at the editorial func-
tion of the speaker from regulation of the transmission function-
or to use the pop argot, between "medium" and "message."36 
Even though both functions come within the general purview of 
the first amendment, they do not invite the same degree of judicial 
scrutiny or demand the same degree of protection.37 It is difficult 
public morals or prevention of sex offenses but of maintaining a minimum level of deco-
rum in the social and cultural environment. See A. BICKEL, THE MoRALITY OF CoNSENT 
73-74 (1975). 
36. One commentator has recently attempted to make this distinction the touchstone 
for defining first amendment coverage. See Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amend· 
men/: Divorcing the Medium from the Message, II fORDHAM URBAN L.J. 163 (1982). As a 
criterion for defining first amendment coverage, the distinction cannot be accepted. As a 
criterion for defining the level of protection, the message-medium distinction parallels-
and might even be subsumed within-the broader distinction between "content-based" re-
strictions, and "content-neutral" actions that burden the exercise of speech, the former call-
ing for stricter scrutiny than the latter. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the 
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 
(1975); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. 
L.J. 727 (1980). Although the distinction-in general terms-is now quite conventional, it 
is not without its problems given the vagueness and variable interpretation of "content-
based" and "content-neutral." See Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment 
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (criticizing the distinction as "theoretically question-
able and difficult to apply"). However. distinguishing among government actions on the 
basis of whether they focus on message (what Ely calls "communicative impact") or on 
means/opportunity of communications seems to me a useful tool of first amendment analy-
sis. Pool's analysis certainly would have benefitted by considering such an approach. 
37. Whatever the difficulties of relying on either the "message/medium" or "content-
based/speech affecting" distinctions (see Redish, supra note 36), it makes no sense to ignore 
the difference between regulations targeting a particular type of message, or even category 
of speech. and general regulatory burdens on a medium of communications. Redish pro-
poses that all "government regulations of expression" should be subject to a "compelling 
interest" standard of justification. ld at 150. The ambit of that proposal is unclear, but if 
it is intended to apply to any regulation that imposes, directly or indirectly, a burden on 
communications activity, his proposal would call for an unacceptable degree of constitu-
tional restraint on social regulation. 
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to imagine applying the usual rigorous test of first amendment jus-
tification to every regulation that affects-even substantially-
communications. Unfortunately, Pool's failure to distinguish be-
tween coverage and degree of protection (the level of judicial scru-
tiny demanded for regulatory constraints) leaves us only to guess 
at what media regulations he would allow. 
Although Pool gives little guidance as to what kinds of social 
interests might justify regulatory interference, he does challenge 
some of the conventional rationales for regulating electronic me-
dia. In the case of broadcasting, he tells us, the scarcity rationale 
is not only inadequate to support direct program controls, it is 
inadequate to justify general licensing as well. Regulatory restric-
tions on entry are largely unnecessary given the availability of 
"less intrusive means" -lotteries or auctions-for achieving the 
legitimate purpose of allocating the radio spectrum.Js 
The FCC's former restrictions on cable television must simi-
larly fail, according to Pool. Although he notes that the issue has 
been partly mooted by the FCC's abandonment of most of its for-
mer regulatory scheme, he regards this step as insufficient, partic-
ularly given the bad precedent it established. Appealing again to 
the print paradigm of media, he observes that the "print tradition 
is not one of deregulation; it is outlawry of regulation."39 
I am not quite sure what to make of this. Again, sweeping 
edicts are capsulized in sweeping, fustian phrases that beg for clar-
ification. To begin with, we may dismiss Pool's characterization 
of the "print tradition" as one of "outlawry of regulation." The 
first amendment does not "outlaw" all regulation even of the print 
media. Though the Court has invalidated laws that single out the 
print media for special legal exactions, it has also insisted that the 
media are not immune from the same general legal burdens and 
regulatory restraints that apply to other, less exalted enterprises. 
Regulations may be specially suspect when they are targeted on 
message content or impose significant and distinctive burdens on 
the press function. None of this amounts to "outlawry of regula-
tion." The present state of the law on press freedom from regula-
tion is simply not reducible to such simplistic labels. Instead, it 
involves an evaluation of the purposes and effects of regulation 
measured against the particular burdens it imposes. Pool unfortu-
nately does not often get down to a level of specificity that permits 
such evaluations to be made. Consider, for example. the practical 
question of common-carrier or like controls, which looms large in 
38. I. PooL, supra note 2, at 138-50. 
39. /d at 166. 
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much of the contemporary debate over "what to do" with new 
communications media-cable, broadcast satellites, and related 
broadband delivery services. Does the first amendment restrain 
the regulation of rates for, say, cable television service? Pool 
questions the wisdom of traditional rate controls here but does not 
address the constitutional issue. He would not preclude all regu-
latory controls, for he approves of local governments' mandating 
access to monopolistic cable systems; at the same time he believes 
forcing cable systems to be purely passive carriers would be 
unconstitutional.40 
Pool's comments on regulation in this and other areas are in-
teresting and informative, as a discussion of social and economic 
policy. My difficulty comes with his tendency to merge sound reg-
ulatory policy with constitutional grundnorms. Not only is he 
vague as to where the line between the two is drawn, he appears to 
be quite indifferent to the distinction. I must confess at this point 
I am myself a little ambivalent. On the one hand, I count myself 
among the skeptics who think of government regulation in general 
as Mies van der Rohe thought of art: "less is more." Government 
regulation is a mischief to be tolerated only where reasonably de-
monstrable gains outweigh the resulting inefficiencies and con-
straints on individual freedom. The number of instances where 
that condition is met in the field of communications is, I believe, 
far fewer than the number of regulations in place.4I On the other 
hand the case against such regulation does not warrant the moral 
fervor of a constitutional crusade. 
Concededly, special constitutional problems are presented by 
zealous regulation when it impinges directly and substantially on 
communications activity, even if the controls are not targeted on 
message content. Even so, I do not see every issue of regulatory 
control in this field as raising a first amendment issue merely be-
cause it affects a medium of communication. Pool, by contrast, 
seems to see a first amendment issue behind every telephone pole 
and in every typewriter and radio circuit. At some points in the 
book he prompted me to wonder whether he believes Forest Serv-
ice restrictions on the harvesting of trees would raise first amend-
ment problems inasmuch as they burden the production of 
pulpwood used for newsprint. 
Pool is not satisfied by the substantial movement towards de-
regulation of communications. He wants deregulation encapsu-
lated into a constitutional commandment that cannot be readily 
40. ld at 176-88. 
41. My skepticism is set out more fully in Robinson, supra note 28, at 236-62. 
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amended as social and economic circumstances dictate. This is, I 
think, a questionable conception of the proper province of consti-
tutionalism. Traditionally, courts avoid constitutional adjudica-
tion if there are nonconstitutional grounds for decision. It is, to be 
sure, a principle sometimes breached by high court and low court 
alike, but it still has the strength of principle if not of a firm rule. 
And it is a sensible principle. 
For one thing, a constitution that is dragged into debate over 
social and economic policies that only faintly implicate constitu-
tional norms is bound to suffer some wear and tear from the en-
counter. The strength of the Constitution-<>£ any constitution-
depends on its ability to claim a degree of social acceptance of the 
underlying norms it expresses. A constitution invoked willy nilly 
where it is not needed-where sensible resolution of the contro-
versy is possible on nonconstitutional grounds-is apt to become 
so routinized as to lose its special stature. I do not say that the 
Constitution-including but not limited to the first amendment-
should not be invoked in matters of ordinary social and economic 
policy. The Court may well have gone too far in its refusal to 
impose even minimal constitutional constraints on economic and 
sociallegislation.42 In particular the Court has been excessively 
indulgent in allowing Congress to avoid political accountability 
for its action by delegating broad, ill-defined legislative authority 
to executive or "independent" agencies, such as the FCC.43 But 
"first" principles ought not be casually put on the line lest they 
cease to be regarded as first principles. 
Aside from possible erosion of basic constitution values, a 
more powerful reason for caution in constitutionalizing matters of 
social and economic policy lies in the simple fact that it overrides 
the majoritarian process of lawmaking. Even where constitutional 
choice does not directly override majoritarian choice it tends to 
encapsulate the social, economic, and political norms of a particu-
lar period, and to retard their change. 
We may grant that much of the regulatory activity in this 
area of communication has been unsound; much of it is positively 
mischievous. One might specifically note that insofar as the argu-
42. For incisive critiques of the Court's virtual abdication of responsibility for over-
seeing social and economic legislation (with which I agree in all essentials), see Mashaw. 
Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TuL. L. REV. 849 
(1980) (arguing for judicial scrutiny to determine whether legislation is minimally "public 
regarding"); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation 
and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34 (disparate treatment of "economic nghts and other 
civil liberties" unjustified by general conceptions of liberty or of judicial restraint). 
43. See Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CoRN. 
L. REV. I (1982). 
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ment for constitutional restraint rests on the need to allow ordi-
nary legal policies a necessary flexibility in adjusting to change, 
one of the vices of such "ordinary" legal policies is that they often 
prevent change. This is precisely one of the strongest indictments 
made against the FCC's regulation of new communications serv-
ices--such as cable. A vigorous application of first amendment 
"laissez-faire" might thus be rationalized as a necessary antidote 
to the heavy hand of regulation. 
But this argument, while not without appeal, simply miscon-
ceives the proper limits of constitutionalism. The Constitution 
may require governmental (legislative) action to be "rational"; 
sometimes it requires it to be "compellingly necessary." But 
neither the Constitution in general nor the first amendment in 
particular is a guarantor of optimal efficiency. If, as Holmes once 
wrote, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer's Social Statics,"44 neither does the first amendment enact 
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. 
IV 
Setting aside the objection to what I see as an overly aggres-
sive constitutionalism implicit in Pool's argument, I am inclined to 
be somewhat more agnostic than he is about the constitutional 
norms being embraced. I mentioned earlier that Pool is unclear in 
identifying which particular features of traditional first amend-
ment doctrine must be preserved against the regulatory encroach-
ments associated with modem electronic media. But his general 
bias is plain enough: he wants minimal interference with speech 
and associated activities. This is what he conceives to be the tradi-
tion of the print media. If it is somewhat romanticized as a 
description of traditional first amendment doctrine, it at least indi-
cates his view of what the right principles of free speech protection 
ought to be. He deplores the modem distinction between elec-
tronic and print media not only because it is artificial, but because 
it implies a departure from the "right" free speech principles. 
I earlier agreed with Pool about the artificiality of this dis-
tinction. Eliminating that arbitrary distinction, however, does not 
axiomatically tell us which set of rules should survive when the 
distinction is gone. Traditionalists like Pool will argue that the 
more restrictive norms associated with the older print medium 
should prevail. I am disposed to agree. There should be a pre-
sumption in favor of any established norm. This presumption es-
44. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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pecially applies to constitutional principles where historical 
conformity and stability are essential to the value of constitution-
alism. But even the most vulnerable, time-honored constitutional 
norms must periodically undergo fresh examination in light of 
contemporary circumstance. 
And they have. Despite the Supreme Court's occasional in-
vocation of the Constitution to resist social change, constitutional 
jurisprudence has adapted itself to contemporary social mores 
(sometimes perhaps too easily). Protection of free speech has not 
been immune from such adaptive change. Even within the "print 
tradition" that Pool extols there has been substantial change, as I 
indicated earlier. Despite Pool's evocation of an ancient print tra-
dition, most of the relevant constitutional law on the subject has 
been developed within the adult memory of living lawyers. 
For the most part, this modem evolution of the first amend-
ment has been in the direction of expanding its ambit and degree 
of protection. However, for me the important lesson of the evolu-
tion is the fact, not the direction, of change in conceptions of basic 
constitutional doctrine. Though my own personal taste runs 
rather more in the libertarian direction than otherwise (possibly as 
much as does Pool's), I reject any notion of a metaconstitutional 
principle that requires all constitutional change, including first 
amendment change, to be expandable only. 
Pool is well aware that there have been changes in judicial 
conceptions of the first amendment. Past and possible future al-
teration of first amendment principles in response to the emer-
gence of electronic media is, indeed, the central concern of his 
book. But he scarcely considers the possibility that such altera-
tions might be more than special adaptions for distinctive, new 
media; they might also reflect a changing perception of basic first 
amendment principles. I alluded to this possibility earlier in argu-
ing that Pacifica should not have rested on the uniqueness of a 
particular medium but should have articulated a more widely ap-
plicable concept of time, place, and manner controls. Perhaps the 
electronic media most clearly dramatize the nature of the underly-
ing concern. If so, it is not inappropriate that the electronic media 
should provide the initial context in which the new ideas about 
constitutional protection are exposed. I do not mean by this to 
suggest that the new media should be used as guinea pigs. I sug-
gest only that the emergence-and dominance--of the new media 
may expose new problems, or new perspectives on old problems, 
that require us at least to think afresh about "venerable" 
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traditions. 45 
Pool shows little disposition to think such heresies. While he 
is boldly imaginative about the ways in which new technologies 
will alter our conception of information and communication, he 
shows no similar boldness in contemplating changes in our basic 
constitutional conceptions. If his basic norms are not beyond 
change, at least they stubbornly resist it. 
His view is not, I concede, unattractive; it offers a degree of 
value stability that is hard to find elsewhere in society outside of 
religion. At the same time this view does demand extraordinary 
faith in the abiding wisdom of a particular time-bound perspec-
tive on constitutional values. Would that I could share such a 
faith. It might reintroduce the comfort of "some of that old time 
religion" into the law. 
45. My point is similar to but quite distinct from that of Bollinger. Freedom of the 
Press and Public Access: Toward a Theorr of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media. 75 
MICH. L. REv. I. 17-26 (1976), who observes that new media technologies have generally 
evoked new apprehension about unregulated speech, and thereby fostered less liberal atti-
tudes about the_ scope of first amendment application. What I am suggesting is something 
more than cautiOn m extending print media traditions to new and "different" media. I am 
suggesting that the new media might prompt new thoughts about the character and degree 
of protection for all media. This is, of course, the very possibility Pool fears-fears about 
which I am dubitante. 
